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PARTNERSHIPS AND BUSINESS CORPORATIONS
ROBIRT E. VANDIVZR*
During the period of Survey, no South Carolina case in the field
of Partnerships was reported to the Surveyor and only one case,
Foster, Adm'x. v. Rulane Gas Company' was reported in the field
of Business Corporations. This innocent looking case turned out to
be rather potent and controversial. Consequently, it will be more
fully presented than if it had been otherwise.
The facts of the reported case were found largely in the dissent-
ing opinion. Plaintiff, a resident of South Carolina, sued on a tran-
sitory cause of action for a tort not connected with any business
activities in South Carolina and committed in North Carolina on or
about March 12, 1952. Rulane Gas Company, the defendant-respon-
dent, was incorporated in North Carolina and domesticated in South
Carolina in 1947 under the domestication statutes,2 designating Pal-
metto Rulane Company, Bennettsville, South Carolina, as the place
where legal papers might be served upon it by delivery to any officer,
agent, or employee of it found there.
The corporation was dissolved under North Carolina laws on
March 31, 1952, and filed its Certificate of Withdrawal from South
Carolina on May 16, 1952, receiving back its previously filed Certifi-
cate of Domestication. Upon commencement of this action, the fol-
lowing methods of service of summons and complaint in March, 1953,
were used: (a) service on the Secretary of State, and the additional
procedure set forth, under Sections 10-424 and 12-722 of the Code
of Laws of South Carolina, 1952, (b) service in Charlotte, North
Carolina, on a former officer of the corporation, who was resident
agent for it, and (c) service in Bennettsville, South Carolina, on a
former employee of Palmetto Rulane Company. Respondent moved
to set aside service for want of jurisdiction. An affidavit recited the
above mentioned dissolution and withdrawal, and further pointed out
that, at the time of the commencement of this action, the respondent
was not engaged in any business in this State and did not have any
agent, officer or employee upon whom process might be served. The
motion was granted by the circuit judge on the ground that the plain
purpose of the domestication statutes and the Code Sections which
*Member of Firm of Watkins, Vandiver & Freeman, Anderson, S. C.; A.B., 1939,
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1. 226 S.C. 149, 84 S.E. 2d 344 (1954).
2. CODE OF LAWs or SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952, § 12-721, et seq.
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relate to the service of process on any foreign corporation doing
business within the State and failing to domesticate,3 was to protect
the citizens of this State to whom such a corporation had become
obligated on transactions had within South Carolina, it being pointed
out that the effect of these laws was to provide an effective means of
maintaining jurisdiction when this occurred, citing Terry Packing
Co. v. Southern Express Company4 as authority for this rule.
Upon appeal, a majority of the South Carolina Supreme Court
(three of the five participating justices concurring in the main opini-
on, with a concurring opinion by one of these three justices, one
justice concurring in the result of the majority opinion, and one jus-
tice filing a dissenting opinion) affirmed the circuit judge. Except
for instructions for affirmance and ordering the circuit judge's order
to be reported, the majority opinion was as follows:
Where a foreign corporation has complied with the statutory re-
quirements as to the appointment of a process agent, the Su-
preme Court of the United States has clearly indicated a leaning
toward the construction of such statutes where possible, that
would exclude from their operation causes of action not arising in
the business done by them in the state. Missouri Pac. Railroad
Co. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co., 257 U. S. 533, 42 S. Ct. 210,
66 L. Ed. 354; Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck
Const. Co., 257 U. S. 213, 42 S. Ct. 84, 66 L. Ed. 201; Chipman
v. Thomas B. Jeffrey Co., 251 U. S. 373, 40 S. Ct. 172, 64 L. Ed.
314.
The concurring opinion added that Section 12-722 of the 1952
Code limits the Secretary of State's authority to accept process ser-
vice for a foreign corporation conducting business in this State with-
out having complied with Section 12-721, which requires the designa-
tion of a place, etc., within the State for service of process, to actions
against the corporation "growing out of the transaction of any busi-
ness in this State". Continuing, this opinion held it to be immaterial
that Section 10-424 (which more fully sets forth the mechanics of
process service on the Secretary of State when Section 12-721 is not
complied with) did not contain the same limitation, since these three
sections, which constituted Section 7765 in the 1942 Code, must be
construed together.
The opinion further noted that, if the action does not arise from
business of a foreign corporation within this State, personal service
3. COr OF LAws o SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952, §§ 12-722 and 10-424.
4. 125 S.C. 198, 118 S.E. 628 (1921).
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within the State on agents of the corporation who may be served, is
essential to jurisdiction.
The vigorous dissenting opinion in the reported case ably portrays
the other side of the question. We quote the following from it:
. . . under Code Section 10-2145 a foreign corporation is sub-
ject to suit by a resident of this State for any cause of action,
which means, of course, that a resident of this State may sue
a foreign corporation in our courts upon a cause of action which
arises in another jurisdiction, if it is a transitory cause of action
and if jurisdiction of the defendant is properly obtained. Lipe
v. Carolina, C. & 0. Ry. Co., 123 S. C. 515, 116 S. E. 101, 103,
30 A.L.R. 248. In the latter, jurisdiction of our court of a
foreign corporation was sustained upon a cause of action for
wrongful death from injuries inflicted in North Carolina ...
This opinion quotes Code Section 12-7056 as providing that
foreign corporations domesticating in South Carolina ". . . shall be
subject to the laws of the same in like manner as corporations char-
tered under the laws of the State . . . ." The dissent continues with
the conclusion that, under this section and two other statutes, 7 the
dissolved foreign corporation in this case continued as a corporate
body for two years after dissolution for the purpose of defending
any suit against it for any liability incurred during its corporate exis-
tence. As to consent of respondent to jurisdiction of the courts of
this State, this opinion states:
. . . Consent by respondent here accompanied its domestication
which was not withdrawn prior to dissolution. Dissolution, we
think, fixed and froze its rights with respect to causes of action
then existing in favor of residents of this State.
The dissenting opinion concludes that the lower court's order
should be reversed, and adds the observation that the methods of
service used in this case are not at issue, since the dismissal of ser-
vice below for lack of jurisdiction was on the ground that the action
did not arise out of business within the State.
The writer views the reported case as a close one. Further argu-
ment supplementing the dissenting opinion is available. Section 12-
721 provides for a process service procedure against a domesticated
foreign corporation (i. e., by service of an agent of the corporation
at a designated place within the State) and contains no limitation to
5. COD OF LAWS O SOUTH CAROLiNA, 1952.
6. CODF OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLiNA, 1952.
7. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CARoLiNA, 1952, §§ 12-601 and 12-644.
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causes of action arising out of business within the State, while Sec-
tion 12-722 provides for a process service procedure (i. e., by ser-
vice of the Secretary of State, etc.) in the event a foreign corpora-
tion transacts business within the State without first complying with
Section 12-721 and in the further event the action arose out of in-
state business. Argument then follows that Section 12-721 is com-
plete, independent and clear of meaning within itself; that it contains
no limitation or restriction to actions arising out of within State
business; and, therefore, that service was sufficient thereunder, with-
out any dependence on Section 12-722. If that argument be sound,
then there is no basis for construing, through interpolation, the legis-
lative intent of Section 12-721 to include such a limitation.
The Lipe case8 was cited in both the majority and dissenting
opinions and, therefore, is worthy of comment. The trend or leaning
of the United States Supreme Court toward limitation of jurisdiction
along the lines set forth in the majority opinion of the case under sur-
vey first appears to have been recognized in this State in the Lipe case.
However, the Lipe case simply reviewed the rule of limitation and
conceded the leaning of the United States Supreme Court toward
construction of domestication statutes "where possible," to deny juris-
diction against a foreign corporation if the cause of action arose from
out-of-state business. In view of the phrase, "where possible," this
leaning would appear to be applicable only where a court can logically
construe the statutes involved to contain a legislative intent of limita-
tion. The Lipe case upheld jurisdiction even though the cause of
action arose from out-of-state business of the foreign corporation,
on the ground that an actual service on its agents doing its 'business
in the State had been made, adding that, therefore, there was no
necessity for the court to pass on the validity of any constructive
service. Thus, the Lipe case merely noted a trend or leaning, and
the recognition of such leaning, not being necessary to the decision
of the case, was obiter dictum. However, the later case of Thompson
v. Queen City Coach Company9 adopted the above leaning and fur-
ther held that in a suit against a foreign corporation where the cause
of action arises out of the State, our courts do not have jurisdiction
unless it be shown that the corporation is doing business within the
State.
To this topic surveyor, the majority opinion of the case under
survey appears to be the more just rule. The logical inference from
8. Lipe v. Carolina C. & 0. Ry. Co., 123 S.C. 515, 116 S.E. 101, 30 A.L.R.
248 (1923).
9. 169 S.C. 231, 168 S.E. 693 (1933).
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the majority rule is that the court, through interpolation, construed
the limitation clause in Section 12-722 to be applicable also to Section
12-721, as well as Section 10-424. The writer attaches particular
importance (apparently more importance than did any opinion in the
case) to the construction of Section 12-721, since it appears to be
the section applicable to the facts of the present case. Admittedly, to
this writer, interpolation is not the strongest agent of construction
and should be used with caution. However, in some cases, interpola-
tion is a necessary and proper instrument of interpretation and con-
struction in arriving at the legislative meaning and intent. Such a
case is the instant case. Surely, the Legislature intended a statutory
meaning and purpose in line with the majority opinion. It is both
inconceivable and quite illogical to think that our Legislature intended
to provide for a wider scope of actions against a domesticated foreign
corporation than against one not domesticated, and thereby punish a
foreign corporation for domesticating as required by our law (since
Section 12-721, setting forth a procedure for service of process on
domesticating corporations, contains no limitation to actions arising
out of business within the State) and reward a foreign corporation
for doing business in the State without domesticating as required by
our law (since Section 12-722, relating to process service on a foreign
corporation failing to domesticate, contains such a limitation). No
citation of authority is necessary to show that there is often only a
fine line between adjudicating and legislating. There is no question
but that the intent of Section 12-721, both in the 1952 Code and as
it appears in our 1942 Code, should have been clearer. Where clarity
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